The Warlord Era (1911-1928) 军阀时代 Overview

In the wake of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, rule of the fledgling Chinese republic was ceded to the army general Yuan Shikai by Sun Yat-sen. Yuan had military support, a vast army at his command and had been instrumental in overturning the the Qing Dynasty. Hence, Sun had little room for manoeuvre. That said, Yuan certainly did not embody Sun’s three principles of nationalism, people’s rights and people’s livelihood. China was, in essence, to become a dictatorial regime for the next four years. Indeed, Peter Zarrow (2005:77) aptly summarises the nature of Yuan Shikai’s brief rule of the newly founded Chinese republic:

Yuan’s rule was marked – and marred – by the following actions: taking loans from the foreign banks and governments (instead of reforming the tax system), crushing parliamentary politics, repressing the so-called Second Revolution, ruling by decree, yielding to most of Japan’s “Twenty-one Demands,” and finally attempting to found a new dynasty in his own right.

The government founded by Yuan Shikai became known as the Beiyang government. It is telling that this name directly derives from the Beiyang Army that Yuan also commanded, symbolic of a militarised form of governance.  Yuan also had to confront the economic burden left by the Qing Dynasty due to the entanglement with foreign powers that had been established over the previous century, Yuan found himself completely dependent upon their every whim.  Arguably, Yuan’s rule was merely an extension of the imperial Qing dynasty, and China was a republic in name only. That said, Yuan certainly attempted to create the image of a new-born nation. Source 1, from a French newspaper, depicts Yuan symbolically cutting off his braid, no longer in thrall to Qing. Yet, Yuan had plans to found his very own dynasty and attempted to reinstate himself as emperor in 1915, a plan he abandoned after just 83 days due to popular discontent.

The newly founded Nationalist Party led by Sun Yat-sen attempted to oppose Yuan in parliament in a ‘second revolution’ in 1913 but Yuan responded by dissolving the party and Sun Yat-sen would once again head into exile, his party being disbanded in November of that year. To make matters worse, Yuan made substantial concessions to Japan. As Zarrow (2005:80) explains:

Aside from control over Shandong, these stipulated recognition of Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, including mining rights; new business rights in Fujian Province (opposite Japan’s colony of Taiwan); a Japanese interest in the huge Han-Ye-Ping iron and coal enterprise in central China – and a final set of demands that would have led to extensive Japanese participation at all levels of the Chinese government.

Yuan tried to rally public support including a boycott of Japanese goods to no avail – eventually he capitulated to all but the last of Japan’s demands to save China from outright colonisation.

Yuan died at the age of 56 on the 6^th June 1916 (Source 2). His attempt at re-establishing the monarchy had ushered in independence movements in regions distanced from his power base in Beijing. As Jonathan Spence (1991:286) notes:

 ‘Many of Yuan’s close political allies abandoned him, and the solidarity of his Beiyang clique of former military protégés was shattered. Throughout China there were mass protests matched by open actions in the provinces. The military leader in Yunnan declared that province’s independence in December 1915; Guizhou followed in January 1916, and Guangxi in March.’

As such, Yuan’s attempts to reinstate an imperial regime sowed the seeds for a provincial battle between rival warlords that would blight China for the next decade. His death left a power vacuum that dealt the final blow to the idealism of Sun Yat-sen and the aims of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. The five-banner flag of the Beiyang Government remained until 1927, but the government itself was scarcely unable to function with leadership regularly changing hands.

Zarrow (2005:86) notes: ‘The fundamental rule of the warlord system was that if any one warlord appeared to be achieving national authority, the others would gang up on him.’ This phenomenon was satirised by a Shanghai-based artist called Shen Bochen. Influenced by western-style political cartoons, in 1918 he took aim at two warlords in a magazine called Shanghai Puck (Source 3). Wu (2013:376) identifies ‘two warlord leaders of the northern and southern governments’, Tang Jiyao of the south and Duan Qirui of the north who are fighting over the prostrated figure of China, too helpless to defend itself.

Interestingly, most of the ruling warlords were supported by different foreign powers; if any of them did manage to unite the country, this could benefit a particular colonial regime whilst in the meantime safeguarding their interests in specific geographical locations. Tang Jiyao, the warlord controlling Yunan province was supported by France whilst Duan Qirui who controlled Anhui province was supported by Japan. In 1919, however, a pivotal event would catalyse the re-emergence of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party, the May Fourth Movement (Source 4). As Chen (2011:142) explains: ‘The May Fourth Movement of 1919 started with students in Beijing protesting the decision taken by Japan and other Allied powers at the Versailles Peace Conference to transfer the former German concessions in Shandong to Japan rather than return them to Chinese sovereignty.’ Naturally, this led to an upsurge in nationalism and the Japanese funded warlord Duan Qirui suffered many protests and outbursts of violence against his rule. In short, Chinese citizens rightly believed the warlords to be in cahoots with foreign powers. Source 4 depicts student protesters in Tiananmen Square. The immediate target of their attacks was the warlord Duan Qirui. As Chen (2011: 144) comments: ‘The police arrested 32 students, and the Beijing government under the domination of Duan Qirui's Anhui faction of warlords decided to punish the arrested students harshly because Duan immediately realized that he was the major target of the movement. It was only under public pressure that, on May 7, the police released all the arrested students.’ In turn, this caused many of Duan’s rival warlords to lend support to the May Fourth Movement.

In the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement, Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party was formally re-established in Guangdong (Source 5). As Source 5 demonstrates, in 1924 the majority of China was still under the control of competing warlord factions. Sun had attempted to send troops to the north to reunify China but no to avail. Moreover, Sun was not favoured by many of the foreign powers at this juncture. As Bergere (1998:300) summarises: ‘They regarded Sun as a rebel and the establishment of his separatist government in Canton, in the Spring of 1921, as a move likely to deepen the country’s divisions and further weaken the central power.’ Moreover, Sun faced particular hostility from Britain given that his Canton Government negatively impacted upon the economic stability of the British-run territory of Hong Kong. Sun desperately needed a foreign ally in order to be able to compete with the warlords who enjoyed support from the imperial powers. The Soviet Union approached Sun at a time of desperation for his fledgling Nationalist Party. In return for Soviet aid, Sun allowed members of the newly formed Communist Party, including a certain Mao Zedong, to enter the Nationalist Party ranks.  

This alliance with the Soviet Union made Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party a contender for national rule once more, the ulitmate aim of all the key players of the warlord era. Indeed, a cartoon by Shanghai-based illustrator Sapajou (Source 6), features Sun Yat-sen and Soviet rule as potential leaders of the future, their names interspersed amongst those of the most powerful warlords. The nation of China is conveyed as a stargazer, embodied by a pipe smoking gentleman with a passive attitude who states ‘More better wait I look-see’ unable to pin their hopes on any one particular candidate. The inclusion of Sun Yat-sen as a ‘shooting star’ may either indicate a resurgence in his popularity of the cartoonist’s preference for Sun as China’s future ruler.

Soviet support enabled the Nationalist Party, in June 1924, to establish ‘The Whampoa military academy, made possible by a Russian gift of 2.7 million Chinese Yuan plus a monthly stipend of 100,000 yuan. In his address on this occasion Sun declared that the goal was to create a ‘new revolutionary army’ modelled after the Soviet Red Army’ (Taylor: 2009:45). The following year, in 1925, Sun passed away from cancer but the military academy that he had established in alliance with the Soviets was pivotal in forging the path to leadership of his successor, Chiang Kai-Shek. Taking the reins from Sun, Chiang soon led the Northern Expedition to reunite China that Sun had attempted a few years earlier. The battle for Chinese unity was hard fought: ‘While the National Revolutionary Army had 85,000 soldiers with about 60,000 rifles, the warlord adversaries could claim ten times as many troops’ (Taylor:2009:55). This was compounded by a rift in internal politics, the Communist wing were reluctant supporters of Chiang’s Northern Expedition as they wished to buy more time to gain further influence in the party. At the outset of the conflict, Chiang had pragmatically reaffirmed his support for the Communist wing of the Nationalist Party, portraying himself as loyal to the ideals of Sun Yat-sen. However, Taylor (2009:55) notes, by 1926, ‘members of Chiang’s staff informed him that leaflets denouncing him, evidently written by the Communists, were appearing in Canton.’ This turned Chiang against the Communists and in 1927 he conducted a brutal purge in Shanghai, known as the ‘Shanghai Massacre’ expelling them from the party once he had gained control of the city.

Notwithstanding, in terms of dealing with the warlords, Peter Zarrow (2005:30) notes: ‘Success begat success as the GMD armies grew by accepting surrendering armies into their command structure.’ Moreover, a weary, and often exploited civilian population were desperate for unity and well-disposed to Nationalist soldiers. In Shanghai, Communist elements actually prepared the ground for Chiang to take the city by spying on warlords before they would be massacred a matter of weeks later in April 1927. Chiang’s final task was to take Beijing and after gaining success he gathered core members of the Nationalist Party in Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum to commemorate the reunification of China, the enduring dream of his predecessor (Source 7).

In sum, whilst the warlord era was a highly chaotic decade characterised by instability and competing regional factions, many key leaders emerged who would be pivotal in the future trajectory of China, in particular, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. It was amidst the political instability ushered in by the warlord era that political alternatives to both imperial and militaristic rule emerged: Nationalism and Communism. Whilst the political idealism of Sun Yat-sen had been anchored in Chinese cultural memory after his death, his political legacy would now be manipulated by these two parties and the former warlords would be largely subsumed into the reinvigorated Nationalist Party which now boasted over two million troops at their disposal and an unquestionable mandate to rule China after ten years of turmoil.

Bibliography

Bergère, M. (1998) Sun Yat-Sen: Marie-Claire Bergère. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Chen, Z. (2011) 'The May Fourth Movement and Provincial Warlords: A Reexamination'. Modern China 37 (2), 135-169.

Spence, J. D. (1991) The Search for Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Taylor, Jay. (2011) The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Wu, I. (2013) 'Participating in Global Affairs: The Chinese Cartoon Monthly Shanghai Puck', 365-387 in:Harder H., Mittler B. (eds) Asian Punches. Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

Zarrow, P. (2005) China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949. London: Taylor & Francis Group.