The Yan'an Period (延安时期) Overview
Although 1921 marked the year in which Chinese Communism was officially ‘born’ in Shanghai’s former French Concession, its followers were acutely persecuted by Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists. Despite this, Saich estimates that ‘CCP membership grew from just under 1000 in January 1925 to almost 58,000 by April 1927’. Such rapid growth worried Chiang as he instigated a brutal massacre to purge Communist influence upon the Nationalist party (see Nanjing Decade). The Communists then settled in Jiangxi but fell victim to repeated encirclement campaigns by Chiang Kai-Shek, threating their very existence. Ultimately, it was the isolated northern territory of Yan’an that would provide Mao Zedong a relatively stable environment from which he could not only exponentially grow the CCP but also elaborate a highly idiosyncratic mixture of Marxism with Chinese characteristics, namely, Mao Zedong thought. This alignment of ideas has also been dubbed the ‘Sinification’ of Marxism.
The road to Yan’an was long and arduous, acquiring an almost mythical status in Chinese cultural memory. On the 16th of October 1934, around 90,000 Communists left Jiangxi under nightfall. This event would become known as ‘The Long March.’ The aim was to retreat north to a base that was not under directly military control by the Nationalists. Before the Long March, Mao had been side-lined by Russian advisors to the CCP. However, at a conference in the city of Zunyi, during the move northwards, his idea of favouring rural as opposed to urban warfare became accepted and he gained military command. Following this turn of events, one of the most iconic moments of the Long March was the crossing of Luding Bridge instigated by Mao Zedong himself (Source 1). Jonathan Spence (1991:407) explains :
The only crossing of this swift, wide river was by a chain suspension bridge with a plank floor. Hostile troops had removed most of the planks and commanded a clear field of fire over the bridge. But twenty of the Communist troops – carrying grenades crawled 100 yards hand over hand across the chains and stormed the position on the other side, routing the defenders. The manoeuvre enabled the rest of the Communist forces to cross the river safely by the end of May 1935.
In the aftermath of Luding bridge, Mao certainly drew upon the heroic actions of the 20 soldiers and other exploits of the Long March for propaganda purposes, asserting in his 1935 work ‘On Japanese Imperialism’ :
The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us.
Despite the triumphalism of Mao, historian Anthony Garavante (1965:123) adopts a different view:
The Long March ended when Mao Tse-tung led the First Corps (about 7,000 men, including Party personnel) into Pao’an in 1935. These men represented the survivors of a force that originally numbered 90,000. This fact alone should be sufficient evidence that the Long March was a Communist defeat.
Indeed, Mao’s skilled manipulation of propaganda would undeniably become a hallmark of his career. Once settled in the Yan’an area, Mao Zedong took the opportunity to write many books that would outline his beliefs for a Chinese-inflected socialism which would acquire the name of Maoism or Mao Zedong thought (Source 2).
As we can see in this summary, Mao firmly believed in the Marxist principle of revolution which was tweaked to accommodate the specific composition of Chinese society by emphasising the importance of peasants over urban labourers. That is not to say however, that Mao’s thought did not equally constitute a radical break when compared with other Chinese thinkers. As Boorman (1966:101) notes:
'Assessed in the light of Chinese tradition, the discontinuities inherent in Mao Tse-tung's view of history are manifest. Acceptance of the theory of the class struggle as the dynamic factor in human history marked an immense break with conventional Chinese historiography and with traditional Confucian emphasis on social harmony.'
Instead of abiding by Confucian notions of social harmony, Mao’s greatest wish was for a peasant uprising. Indeed, Mao believed that peasant wars and revolutions were what had most characterised Chinese history. Although, Mao had written that the rise of the bourgeoise was an intermediate stage before proletarian revolution, his land reform policies seem to omit this proposed stage, handing private farmland directly to the peasantry before the eventually became government property or communes. As such, out of all the different elements that constituted Maoist thought, perhaps the most important of all was his theory of the mass line formulated at Yan’an in multiple texts and talks (Source 3). If we analyse Mao’s own writings, it becomes clear that he viewed the masses as the defining force in enabling historical progress. He questioned the efficacy of top-down strategies, arguing that policy should come from the people and then be implemented in accordance with Marxist-Leninist thought, as Mao himself summarised ‘from the masses, to the masses’ (Young:1980:227). However, certain commentators on the mass line advocate for a rather different interpretation questioning Mao Zedong’s supposedly unwavering faith in the people:
Although Mao frequently expresses faith in the masses' creativity and enthusiasm for revolutionary change, he also undoubtedly shares the Leninist scepticism of the possibility or efficacy of spontaneous mass activity. His writings and his political activity both have as central propositions the need for Party leadership in the Chinese Revolution (Young: 1980:226)
In reality, under Mao, the party infrastructure became the most important element in the organisation of revolution - the masses had to abide by the party line as much as party cadres had to abide by the will of the masses.
Mao was writing many of his key texts, speeches and theories from Yan’an in the midst of the Sino-Japanese war which broke out in 1937. During the early stages of conflict, membership of the CCP dramatically increased, as Spence (1991:461) notes: ‘CCP membership increased dramatically in the period from around 40,000 in 1937 to an estimated 800,000 in 1940.’ Disillusionment with Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists as well as the safety of residence in Yan’an were key factors. To accompany this new-found mass membership, Mao launched his first mass movement: the Yan’an rectification movement (Source 4). Mao felt that all new members of the CCP should be well-versed in the principles of Marxism as well as the notion of ‘revolutionary correctness.’ This, in effect, meant a cycle of self-criticism particularly from elite members of the party. Whilst this seemed to be in keeping with the premise of the mass line, all citizens of Yan’an were compelled to closely follow party directives and no form of deviation was allowed.
Many party members were accused of counter-revolutionary thinking, with some even imprisoned, tortured and executed. Of course, Mao’s ulterior motive here was to rid the party of any opposition that could challenge his position of power, particularly pro-Moscow factions and intellectuals. In 1943, Mao was elected chairman of the central committee of the CCP in 1943, assuming the role of leader. The rectification movement was meticulously well planned following a strict procedure as Liang (2003:226) notes in detail:
The campaign began with a study session, which was a well-planned multi-month-long program. During this stage, selected documents—mainly Mao’s writings—were carefully read, lectured on, and examined. The study session was followed by self-criticism, during which each participant had to write self-criticism notes. The Party had the right to randomly check anyone’s notes. Since everyone had to write them, it did not seem to be intimidating at first; but the Party could use the writings as evidence against the writer. The Party successfully manipulated the movement by directing their attack against targets such as doctrinairism, empiricism, and liberalism. Each had a specific meaning: doctrinairism was the name for Soviet-trained intellectuals, empiricism was conveniently used for attacking most military leaders who were little exposed to Marxist theory, while liberalism was the accusation mostly used against the newly arrived young intellectuals who demonstrated any behaviour that could be read as disliking the Party’s leadership, principles, and disciplines. The self-criticism was often combined with mutual-criticism: one had to display his/her fault and condemn it publicly.
Whilst the Sino Japanese war was arguably the most pivotal element in the CCP’s rise to power, the control, respect and cult-like status Mao was able to exert over his party as a result of the rectification campaign, was also a highly important factor, especially when compared to the fragmented nature of the Nationalist party which was beset by power struggles, nepotism and poorly trained troops.
Another aspect of Mao’s sweeping reforms in Yan’an was the 1942 conference on art and literature. Art and literature during the Nanjing decade enjoyed a relative amount of freedom, the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek pilloried in numerous satirical cartoons for example. Art and literature could be subjective in nature and , although some instances of censorship existed, there was certainly no need to align oneself with politics or a particular cause. This was all to change for those living under the Yan’an regime. At the Yan’an conference, Mao proclaimed that all art should further the cause of socialism and reflect working class and peasant life. Ding and Lu (2018) note:
This talk was established as the sole source for artistic and literary creation. It resulted in top-down orders that limited artistic creation to a narrow framework at the service of ideology; it also determined that the ensuing artworks should, in content and form, be easy to disseminate. In the lecture, Mao particularly emphasised the ‘question of who art and literature is for’ pointing out that literature ‘consists fundamentally of the problems of working for the masses and how to work for the masses’. The reading public was bestowed with intangible political rights and critical authority. Consequently, publications established sections for ‘letters from readers’, turning readers into important writers of art criticism, making for a unique critical method.
Art therefore became part of the cycle of self-criticism that Mao had instigated as part of the Yan’an rectification movement. Source 5 is a photograph by Wu Yinxian, one of Mao Zedong’s favourite photographers, commemorating the Yan’an conference on art and literature that was attended by around 200 people. Interestingly, Yinxian adopts a side angle view focussed on the site-specific location of Yan’an with its mountain range and its simple dwellings as much as the people in this photograph. He studied photography professionally in Shanghai and: ‘During his studies, he bought an old American Brownie camera at a second-hand market, and began to use photography and film to document the suppression of the poor by the rich, the warlords and the Japanese invaders. (Ding and Lu: 2018), a handy resume of the three main scourges afflicting China during both the Nanjing and Yan’an periods. Mao would also set up an art and literature academy, named after the modernist writer Lu Xun who passed away in 1936. Like Mao, he believed that literature should be socially aware. Apart from writing novels, Lu Xun pionnered the Chinese use of the woodblock print which would be instrumental in depicting land reform. The legacy of the Yan’an conference can still be felt today with China’s current president Xi Jinping espousing the similar views on literature as Mao Zedong.
Towards the end of the Sino-Japanese war, it was clear that the Communists were not only a force to be reckoned with in China but also internationally recognised. The United States were particularly interested in knowing more about the CCP, pondering whether or not to establish official relations with them. Mao welcomed guests from the United States Army Observation Group to Yan’an, commonly know as the ‘dixie mission’. When US diplomat John Service arrived in Yan’an he noted ‘that insofar as an ongoing revolution was modernizing China, the standard had passed from the Nationalist party to the CCP, "a well-integrated movement, with a political and economic program," which "has grown to a healthy and moderate maturity (Wang:2010:125). Mao had asked Service if the US could provide weaponry to the CCP in order to prevent war with the Nationalists but only requested "light and simple rather than heavy offensive weapons" that had been provided to the Nationalists. Further, he underscored that the CCP's stated policy was to avert civil war.’ (Wang:2010:127). Mao’s request was granted but the Americans would certainly view this latter statement on avoiding Civil War as a betrayal on the part of both the Nationalists and the Communists.
Another concern of the US government was the CCP’s close relations with Russia: ‘Many of the US delegation naively embraced the assumption that once it was isolated from the Soviet Union, the CCP would remain at the stage of socialist democracy and be forced to abandon communism.‘ (Wang:2010:143) Whilst Mao certainly adapted communist thought to a Chinese context, the Marxist-Leninist base of Mao’s thinking had been firmly anchored in Yan’an and was not about to shift.
The leader of the Dixie mission was Colonel David Barrett pictured here (Source 6) with Mao Zedong in Yanan. Although Barrett still had a positive impression overall of Mao’s troops, unlike Service, he noted that indoctrination took precedence over practical military training. When it became clear that the Nationalists and the Communists were preparing for civil war (see separate section), the Dixie mission was abandoned and the US threw their support behind Chiang Kai-Shek who disposed of greater troops and weaponry despite the negative opinions many US officials held towards the generalissimo. Before the tide of the Civil War turned in favour of the Communists, the Nationalists secured a symbolic victory, taking Yan’an in 1947 and the base was abandoned until the Communists victory of 1949.
In short, the Yan’an decade can be characterised in four key ways. First of all, the Yan’an period was where the Communists transformed from a fringe political movement, on the verge of destruction, to a party of mass membership and a viable contender to govern China. Second of all, Yan’an is the birthplace of Maoism, where the Russian model of Communism was adapted towards the situation of the Chinese peasantry. Next, the Yan’an period marks the occasion when the CCP were first taken seriously in the international arena with US attempts to establish diplomatic relations, mediating, however unsuccessfully, between the Nationalists and the Communists. Finally, Yan’an is where the communist propaganda machine firmly comes into play. Accusations of the Dixie mission being staged managed are rife- indeed it is unlikely the American visitors would have witnessed any of Mao’s purges as a consequence of the rectification movement. In art and literature, art would be in service of the state rather than that of beauty or emotion. As such, we can view the Yan’an period as vital for the growth of the CCP and the consolidation of Mao’s mandate to lead.
References
Boorman, H. L. (1966) 'Mao Tse-Tung as Historian'. The China Quarterly (28), 82-105.
Garavente, A. (1965) 'The Long March'. The China Quarterly (22), 89-124.
Liang, K. (2003) 'The Rise of Mao and His Cultural Legacy: The Yan'an Rectification Movement'. Journal of Contemporary China 12 (34), 225-228.
Liu Ding and Carol Yinghua Lu, ‘From the Issue of Art to the Issue of Position: The Echoes of Socialist Realism’, Tate Research Publication, 2018, https://www.tate.org.uk/research/research-centres/tate-research-centre-asia/socialist-realism, accessed 16 November 2019.
Spence, J. D. (1991) The Search for Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Tony Saich ‘The Chinese Communist Party During the Era of the Comitern (1919-1943) Article prepared for Juergen Rojahn, “Comintern and National Communist Parties Project,” International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. http:// ksghome.harvard.edu/~asaich/chinese-communisty-party-during-comintern.pdf.
Wang, J. (2010) 'No Lost Chance in China: The False Realism of American Foreign Service Officers, 1943-1945'. The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 17 (2), 118-145 Young, G. (1980) 'On the Mass Line'. Modern China 6 (2), 225-240.